The polarization in Congress and the gridlock that it has fostered is slowing the lawmaking process and could as well be decreasing the civility of American politics. This is the reality that legislators have to face every day, trying to implement laws among a divided government and a divided electorate with a high degree of party cohesion. Today, Congress is in a contentious state, but this polarization cannot be attributed to one factor. It can be traced through the past sixty years and the events that unfolded during this time period, such as the rise of the Republican Party and the realignment that occurred. Newt Gingrich was an especially prominent figure through the nineties and eighties, spear-heading a Republican grab for power among a Democratic majority. He implemented an especially effective, but belligerent strategy in his grab for political power, employing special orders to undermine the majority. The Republicans were able to utilize these speeches, given at the end of a legislative day, in their endeavor to weaken the contending party and gain a majority. Gingrich, the rising of firm Republican cohesion, and their fighting strategy were shortly embodied in the special order speeches and this new aggressive style has contributed to the polarization and gridlock of Congress today.
Historically, special orders were of little importance, only delivered for insertion into the Congressional Record, but this changed quickly with television cameras entering the chamber. Newt Gingrich was the mastermind behind exploiting special orders, employing them as a strategy to undermine the Democratic majority. Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein describe his actions in this way: “The core strategy was to destroy the institution in order to save it, to so intensify public hatred of Congress that voters would buy into the notion of the need for sweeping change and throw the majority bums out” (pg. 32). He was able to accomplish this partly through special orders, which can be defined as non-legislative debate given as speeches at the end of the legislative day, with any member speaking up to one hour. Because special orders occur at the end of the day, most members are not present. Gingrich was able to manipulate these speeches beneficial to the Republicans, but in a way the Democrats despised.
Gingrich and Bob Walker were both participating in special orders on this day, Nov. 12, 1983, with the two periodically yielding to each other to express their point. In these speeches they frequently discussed allowing school prayer, immigration problems, and irresponsible Democratic government. As was illustrated in the above video, the Republicans twisted the speeches to look like debate, but with no answer from the other side. In this way they were able to project their views on the American people, but also mislead them. Not everyone watching understood that the House was empty and so would assume the Democrats were not answering to the Republicans who were challenging them, which could be interpreted as incompetent Democratic lawmakers who accepted the charges against them, had no desire to counter them, or were in fact unable to. Because this was greatly upsetting to the Democrats, in May 1984 speaker O’Neill ordered the C-Span cameras to pan the chambers instead of specifically focusing on the speech giver. This was able to convey to the audience that the chamber was actually empty, undermining the Republican’s strategy. Gingrich did not respond too kindly to this or to O’Neill’s complaint that Republicans were challenging the patriotism of his party. Below is a clip of Gingrich’s speech on May 15, 1984, which he delivered before the house during normal business hours. In an earlier episode he accused the speaker of, “resembling a McCarthyism of the Left,” and their debate continues on this contentious day. This is part of Gingrich’s response to Speaker O’Neill and his new rule that the cameras must pan the chamber.
As can be seen in the clip above, Gingrich’s speech was not accepted well by everyone in the House. Afterwards the speaker exploded, “You deliberately stood in that well before an empty House, and challenged their patriotism, and it is the lowest thing that I’ve seen in my 32 years in Congress.” A Republican member immediately asked for the words to be removed and some chaos ensued and Gingrich can be seen in close conversation with some of his Republican allies, such as Bob Walker. Five minutes passes before the clerk rereads the speaker’s words and someone can be heard saying, “What’s wrong with that?” After this contentious episode, partisanship in Congress started to increase more than ever. The Republicans and Democrats were now pitting themselves against each other in an environment that was soon to become more partisan than ever before.
Special orders are not only used to undermine one party, but for many other reasons as well, including re-election prospects and furthering one’s policy goals. In a study carried out by Forrest Maltzman and Lee Sigelman, they demonstrate that those who employ unconstrained floor time are mostly in the minority or demonstrate an extreme ideology. Newt Gingrich is a perfect example for both of these cases as a minority Republican and an ultra-conservative legislator. It could also be potentially argued that members use unconstrained floor time for re-election prospect, although more are going to participate in speeches to further their policy goals. This allows members to advance their own personal and political goals without the constraint of the majority party. Researchers Maltzman and Sigelman write, “Because floor debate is usually so tightly structured by the majority party, these largely unfettered floor speeches provide a unique window through which to observe the politics of talk” (pg. 819). Although, not all members uniformly utilize special orders with some never participating and some participating almost every day. According to the same study, 280 members game 1,383 special order speeches during the 102nd Congress (pg. 820). Members will have different motivations to propel them to speak and some are going to be completely uninterested in participating, which takes time and resources.
For members interested in their electoral prospects, special orders can allow them to take a position on a relevant issue relating to their constituency, advertising their policy agenda, and credit claiming. Below is a video Eni Faleomavaega, a Congressional Delegate from American Samoa advocating for his people.
Not everyone who participates in floor speeches has a specific goal in mind, such as the eccentric Representative Trificant, who seemed little concerned with policy oriented topics. Delegate Faleomavaega was thanking those who helped in the devastating aftermath of a hurricane and asking for continuing assistance. He has a specific goal in mind, but not pushing for a contentious ideological policy. This clip demonstrates the more mundane reasons why House members choose to employ special orders, which can be seen throughout most of Congress’s history, with special orders only arising as an extreme political strategy during the 1980s.
Most members on the “outside” are going to participate in these speeches as an avenue to “advance an alternative agenda” (822). Rep. Bob Walker, one of Gingrich’s allies during the rise of special orders in the 1980s argued in favor of these speeches as, “When we can get a blocked period where we control the subject matter, where we can decide what the issue will be and where we can discuss the issues on our own terms,” (Matlzman, Sigelman, pg.822). The main goal of these minority members was to push their policy agenda without the constraint of the majority party.
Not only can minority members advantage from special orders, but junior members as well. These members do not have a large policy influence due to the seniority norms that pervade committee positions. Freshman cannot as easily obtain positions of significance because these positions are simply not available to them and are allocated to more senior members. Although, there is not much evidence in Congress supporting the hypothesis that junior members participate in special orders for this reason. They could potentially advantage from special orders and it will be interesting to see if any other faction of legislators decides to employ special orders for political gain as the Republicans in the 1980s.
Party leaders also could potentially benefit from special orders. Newt Gingrich was an aspiring majority speaker and already a party leader in the minority. These prominent figures could promote party unity through floor speeches as a way to communicate with their party in and outside the institution of Congress. The Republican Party was very issue oriented with a high level of cohesion during the early 1990s, with many Republicans running for election in 1994 signing a pledge titled a “Contract with America.” This statement promised a vote on ten conservative pieces of legislation, but only if the American people voted a majority of Republicans into office. Because of Gingrich and his party’s efforts, they achieved a House majority in 1994 with Gingrich as the speaker. Party unity was strong during this period, but only within the House as a Republican Senate did not sign the “Contract with American,” and so was not committed to its goals as the other chamber (Hershey, Majorie, pg.300). Because of this, many of the laws promised in the “Contract with America” were not translated into public policy.
Special orders were able to be exploited for political gain, contributing to the new dynamic of Congress that is prevalent today. Today, special orders are not as utilized in the House with Republicans holding a majority and a Democratic minority that does not favor them. When special orders arose, Democrats were in the majority and not as concerned with undermining the contending party. Republicans were able to twist special orders in a way to benefit their policy agenda and conservative ideology. This is just one example of a way a party can try to access political power. This strategy helped to allow the Republicans to achieve a majority in 1994 and allowed Gingrich to become speaker of the House
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